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Abstract
Within the debates on curbing Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey, the
pro-Islamic approach puts emphasis on empowering the notion of ‘Islamic
brotherhood’ between Turks and Kurds. The socio-economic approach, on
the other hand, draws attention to improving the socio-economic status
of the Kurds. By using World Values Survey data, this study tests these
two distinct approaches. Logit estimates provide strong support for the
socio-economic approach. Individuals with a better socio-economic
status (i.e. higher level of education and income) are less likely to support
Kurdish ethno-nationalist formations while religion-related factors do
not have a significant impact. Some theoretical and policy implications
are also provided.
Keywords: Ethno-nationalism; Kurds; Islamic brotherhood; income; education;
logit.
Introduction
It is an empirical fact that ethnic and religious tensions constitute the
most salient sources of conflict in the contemporary world (Gurr 1993,
2000; Sarkees, Wayman and Singer 2003). The Turkish Republic, too,
has been experiencing ethnic and religious challenges (Saatci 2002;
Yavuz 2003). It is a widely shared observation that ‘identity politics’
has been on the rise in Turkey since the early 1980s. Within this
process, it is argued, the rise of Islamic, Alevi and Kurdish identities
has challenged the organic, monolithic understanding of society (see
Bruinessen 1994, 1996; Bozarslan 1996, p. 19; Zubaida 1996; Kirisci
and Winrow 1997, p. 121; Onis 1997; Cizre-Sakallioglu 1998; Duran
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1998; Yavuz 1999, 2001, p. 11, 2003; Kramer 2000, pp. xiii11;
Ozbudun 2000, p. 143; Somer 2004; Keyman and Icduygu 2005,
p. 8; Yavuz and Ozcan 2007).
Although the ‘Kurdish question’ has been a central issue in both the
domestic and foreign policy of the Republic since its initiation in the
early 1920s (Watts 1999; Guney 2002, p. 122; AydInli 2002, p. 210;
Yavuz and Ozcan 2006, p. 102), Kurdish ethno-nationalism has
emerged as one of the biggest challenges to the Turkish state and
democracy in the last two or three decades (see Gunter 1997, p. 127;
Cizre-Sakallioglu 1998; Kramer 2000, p. 52; Yavuz 1999, 2000, p. 37,
2001; Cornell 2001; Cizre 2002; Moustakis and Chaudhuri 2005, p. 78;
Somer 2005, p. 595).1 As Yavuz and Ozcan rightly observe:
Today, Turkey is more polarized along ethnic lines than a decade
ago, and the Kurdish problem has shifted from the military sphere
to the social and political spheres. It is not the Turkish state that is
confronting the Kurds any longer but Turks and Kurds confronting
each other. (Yavuz and Ozcan 2006, p. 103)
Within such a political environment, the Republic has been struggling
to respond to Kurdish demands, which range from the recognition of
‘difference’ and of cultural and political rights to total separation
(Cizre 2002, p. 237; Keyman 2005, p. 268; Yavuz and Ozcan 2006,
p. 102).
The central objective of this study is not to provide a discussion of
Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey, 2 but to assess the validity of
two different approaches to dealing with the problem: pro-Islamic and
socio-economic. The first approach emphasizes strengthening religious
attachments and values (i.e. empowering an Islamic brotherhood
understanding between Turks and Kurds) in order to curb Kurdish
ethno-nationalism, while the second approach draws attention to
improving the socio-economic status of individuals, especially in the
impoverished south east, populated mostly by the Kurds.
In order to see which one of these approaches or policies might curb
Kurdish ethno-nationalism, a better grasp of the factors and dynamics
behind pro-Kurdish tendencies in society is needed. However,
although there is more open debate and there have been an increasing
number of scholarly studies on various aspects of Turkey’s Kurdish
issue in the last decades (see, for instance, Entessar 1992; McDowall
1996; Olson 1996; Kirisci and Winrow 1997; Barkey and Fuller 1998),
the sources of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in society remain relatively
under-investigated. Put differently, we have rather limited empirical
knowledge of the factors that hinder or accelerate the appeal of
Kurdish ethno-nationalist ideas and movements in society. This is
rather surprising because a healthy solution to this controversial issue
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requires having a better understanding of the factors and dynamics
behind Kurdish ethno-nationalism in the country. The following
questions direct this work: Which factors shape Kurdish ethno-
nationalism in the society? What might be the theoretical and
policy-making implications of such an analysis in managing ethno-
political demands?
By using World Values Survey data, this study investigates the
impact of religiosity and socio-economic factors (i.e. the level of income
and education) on support for Kurdish ethno-nationalist movements
and formations (i.e. Kurdish ethno-nationalism). The statistical results
indicate that religiosity does not have a significant impact on the
likelihood of Kurdish ethno-nationalism. However, as the level of
education and income increases, the likelihood of ethno-nationalist
tendencies declines. While supporting the socio-economic approach,
these empirical findings disconfirm the pro-Islamic approach. With
respect to implications, the findings suggest that, unlike the pro-
Islamic approach, it is difficult to assume a zero-sum relationship
between ethnic and religious attachments.
The article proceeds as follows. First, the main theoretical premises
of pro-Islamic and socio-economic approaches to Kurdish ethno-
nationalism are presented along with testable hypotheses. The
empirical section then examines those hypotheses through indivi-
dual-level data provided by the World Values Survey. The conclusion
discusses some theoretical and policy implications of the empirical
findings.
Theoretical discussion and hypotheses
Pro-Islamic approach
This approach anticipates that if individuals identify themselves with
Islamic values and understandings, then, the role of ethnicity in self-
identification would decline. This, in turn, should undermine the
appeal to Kurdish ethno-political movements and formations.
The roots of this approach go back to the Hamidian era (1878
1908) in the late Ottoman period. The territorial losses in the
nineteenth century had made the empire both more Asiatic and
Muslim. In order to prevent further losses, Abdulhamit II tried to
promote the idea of ‘Muslim solidarity’ among the different ethnic
elements of the empire by emphasizing the caliphate (Bruinessen 1992,
p. 268; Zurcher 2003, p. 79).
In the multi-party Republican era, this approach has been expressed
several times by various pro-Islamic or conservative parties. For
instance, the openly pro-Islamic Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, 198398)
believed that the destruction of the ‘Islamic Brotherhood’ by the
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Republican policies of modernization (read Westernization) and
secularization, which included the abolition of the caliphate and
religious orders and brotherhoods, was one factor which led to the rise
of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in the country (see McDowall 1996,
p. 439; Yavuz 1998; Duran 1998).
The ruling Adalet ve KalkInma Partisi (Justice and Development
Party, AKP), which presents itself as a democratic and conservative
centre-right party, also expressed similar views. According to the AKP,
the secular nature of the Republic is the main cause of the Kurdish
problem in Turkey. As Yavuz and Ozcan (2006, p. 103) suggest, the
AKP believed that ‘[t]he Kurdish problem is not about nationalism but
rather forced secularism and Turkish nationalism of the type enforced
by Kemalist ideology. If we stress common Islamic ties and brother-
hood, we can enhance the country (memleket) and also end the
conflict.’ Thus, for the pro-Islamic approach, preventing societal
polarization along ethnic lines requires using Islam as cement between
Turks and Kurds (see Baslevent, Kirmanoglu and Senatalar 2005,
p. 559; Yavuz and Ozcan 2006, p. 103). In other words, it is believed
that ‘the Islamic layer of identity could be useful in terms of containing
ethnic tensions and finding a peaceful solution’ (Yavuz 1998, p. 12).
This approach is based on the idea that Islam has traditionally
played an important role among the Kurds (see Bruinessen 1992;
Yegen 1996, p. 225; Atacan 2001, pp. 11112; Cizre 2002, pp. 22930).
However, the comprehensive secularization process initiated by the
founders of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s loosened this bond
between Turks and Kurds and led to the marginalization of the Kurds,
who used to identify themselves as part of the Muslim community
under Ottoman rule (Entessar 1992, pp. 835; Bruinessen 1992, p. 269,
1994; Yegen 1996, pp. 21925; Barkey 1998; Yavuz 1998, pp. 1112;
Saatci 2002, p. 557). As Cizre-Sakallioglu (1998, p. 77) notes, pro-
Islamic intellectuals believed that ‘by upholding a secular, that is ‘anti-
religious nationalism’ based on ethnicity [Turkish], official Turkish
nationalism contributed to the rise of its twin sister, Kurdish
nationalism’. Thus, it is believed that the Republic’s strict secularist
policies undermined Islamic values, which once bound different
Muslim ethnic groups together, and this in turn empowered Kurdish
ethno-nationalism.
The pro-Islamic approach, therefore, asserts that re-emphasizing
Islam as a shared value among Turks and Kurds would restrain
societal polarization along ethnic lines and consequently curb Kurdish
ethno-nationalism (Yavuz 1997, p. 74; Duran 1998). As Houston
suggests, ‘for Islamist discourse . . .kardeşlik [Muslim brotherhood]
implies the cessation of separatist claims in the name of Muslim
unity . . . and the subordination of Kurdishness to a ‘‘higher identity’’
(üst kimlik)’ (1999, p. 91, emphasis in original). For instance, the leader
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of the AKP and the Prime Minister Erdogan once argued that both
Turkish and Kurdish identities should be treated as ‘ethnic sub-
identities’, which are tied together under a primary identity: ‘citizen-
ship’ (Hürriyet 25 November 2005; Sabah 23 November 2005; see also
Yavuz and Ozcan 2006, pp. 11112). Within such an understanding of
citizenship, Islamic identity is expected to function as a unifying factor
among the peoples of Turkey (Yavuz 1998, 17; Gunter and Yavuz
2007, pp. 298; Duran 2008, p. 97).3
It was an interesting development that the AKP, which tried to
promote the idea of Islamic brotherhood vis-à-vis Kurdish ethno-
nationalism, received substantial support from Kurdish regions during
the November 2002 and July 2007 national elections. It is suggested
that the most of AKP’s votes in the region came from Islamically
influenced Kurdish villages, towns and cities (Yavuz and Ozcan 2006,
109). Gunter and Yavuz, for instance, suggest that:
The AKP is the only party with dense social networks in every
corner of the country, along with municipal governments, and all
these networks were mobilized for the party’s victory. Due to the role
of dominant religious networks in the Kurdish regions, the AKP also
received a major victory in these provinces. One could conclude that
the only chance for ending the relentless and destructive Kurdish
insurgency will come from the AKP since it is the only Turkish party
that appeals to voters in all Kurdish regions. For the national
integration of Turkey, this offers great hope. (Gunter and Yavuz
2007, p. 296, emphasis added)
Thus, inspired by the success of the conservative AKP among the
Kurds, conservative circles expected that raising Islamic consciousness
to a higher level by empowering religious (Islamic) feelings and
attachments should reduce the appeal of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in
the region. This discussion leads us to the following hypothetical
expectation:
H1: Empowering religious (Islamic) consciousness would reduce
the likelihood of appeal to Kurdish ethno-nationalism.
Socio-economic approach
According to the (relative) deprivation theory, the deprivation of a
certain group creates frustration among the members of that group.
This in return leads to aggression and hostility vis-à-vis the perceived
aggressor(s) and consequently to political mobilization in various
forms (Gurr 1970, 1993, p. 167). Gurr states that ‘[g]rievances about
differential treatment and the sense of group cultural identity provide
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the essential bases for mobilization and shape the kinds of claims
made by the group’s leaders’ (1993, p. 167). Icduygu, Romano and
Sirkeci (1999) support this approach by suggesting that an environ-
ment of material and non-material insecurity caused by a low level of
socio-economic status and the suppression of group identity might
lead to ethnic revival and mobilization. Similarly, Horowitz (1985, pp.
2339) observes that separatist movements are more likely to be found
among backward groups in economically underdeveloped regions.
One implication of this approach is that an increase in the socio-
economic status of the members of the disadvantaged group should
restrain ethno-political grievances and demands. Such an under-
standing is rather strong among the Turkish state and political elite.
The official state position on the Kurdish issue is that there is no
ethno-political problem in Turkey, but rather a problem of regional
terrorism resulting from the socio-economic backwardness of south-
eastern Turkey (e.g. feudal, tribal social structures, limited economic
growth and unemployment in the region) (Kushner 1997, p. 224;
Cornell 2001, p. 31; Cizre 2002, p. 248; Lundgren 2007, pp. 679).
It is a fact that the region has been the least developed part of the
country (for more on regional disparities, see Kirisci and Winrow
1997, pp. 1226; White 1998; Icduygu, Romano and Sirkeci 1999). It is
believed that the socio-economic underdevelopment in the region has
led to the alienation of the Kurds from the state and created favourable
conditions for separatism or reactionary movements (Entessar 1992,
pp. 610; McDowall 1996, p. 402). For instance, former Prime Minister
Bulent Ecevit (19252006) stated to the author that ‘Turkey does not
have a Kurdish problem. There is a socio-economic underdevelopment
in the region. By abusing this, several external actors such as
neighbouring and some European countries have promoted Kurdish
terrorism/separatism in the region to destabilize and divide the Turkish
Republic.’4
Since it is believed that the socio-economic underdevelopment of the
region accelerates reactionary movements against the state and
provides ‘human material’ for the separatist organization PKK, a
socio-economic master plan was necessary to reduce the appeal to
such formations (Şükrü Elekdag in Aydinli 2002, p. 217; Ismail Cem in
Lundgren 2007, p. 45). In brief, the adherents of the view which
postulates an inverse relationship between socio-economic status and
ethno-nationalism expect that a socio-economic improvement in
the south east (e.g. eliminating poverty and feudal structures,
increasing education levels) should constrain support for Kurdish
ethno-nationalist ideas and movements.
Interestingly, however, one can also argue that, rather than
obstructing the ‘politics of difference’, improvements in the socio-
economic status might actually accelerate it. For instance, Inglehart
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(1977, 1988, pp. 12245) observes that the ‘high level of prosperity’ in
post-war Western countries led to the emergence of post-materialist
values in those societies. In other words, ‘material affluence’ in the
advanced industrial societies shifted individuals’ attention from ‘bread
and butter issues’ to some other concerns such as the sense of
community, belonging, self-expression and the quality of life. This
might also be expected for ethno-political groups in the sense that a
certain degree of the satisfaction of basic material needs (e.g. physical
sustenance and safety) of the members of a previously disadvantaged
group may pave the way for mobilization of the group members for
certain identity-related demands (e.g. cultural and political rights for
the group). As several cases across the world indicate, the members of
‘advantaged groups’ also mobilize for more political rights, such as
greater autonomy or total separation (think of the cases of the Catalan
and Basque movements in Spain and the Lega Nord in Italy).
Considering all these factors, one might hypothesize that:
H2a: Increases in socio-economic status decrease the likelihood
of Kurdish ethno-nationalism.
H2b: Increases in socio-economic status increase the likelihood
of Kurdish ethno-nationalism.
Before moving further, it is important to indicate at this point that
these two approaches might be distinct but they may also coexist. For
instance, although AKP officials express pro-Islamic views on the
Kurdish issue, they also believe that some other factors such as limited
socio-economic development in the region have also contributed to
this problem. For instance, during his Diyarbakir visit (12 August
2005), conservative PM Erdogan openly stated that ‘Turkey has a
Kurdish problem. In the past, Turkish Republic made some mistakes
in dealing with this problem. However, the solution should be more
democracy, more citizenship rights and more welfare’ (Radikal 13
August 2005) Thus, although it is analytically useful to treat pro-
Islamic and socio-economic approaches as distinct understandings, a
combination of these two is also a possibility in the real world. In other
words, it is difficult to treat them as mutually exclusive approaches.
Furthermore, the reverse is also a possibility in the sense that even
secular circles sometimes toy with the idea of promoting religion as an
antidote against Kurdish ethno-nationalism. For instance, the strictly
secular Turkish military once distributed in Kurdish areas pamphlets
containing verses of the Koran which hailed obedience to state
authority (Oran 2001; see also McDowall 1996, p. 432). This is a
clear indication that a pro-Islamic approach is not necessarily
defended exclusively by religiously conservative circles. The following
Curbing Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey 539
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section empirically tests to what extent these two approaches might be
useful in curbing Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey.
Research design and method
Ethno-nationalism is defined as the ‘transformation of ethnicity from a
purely personal quest for meaning and belonging into a group demand
for respect and power’ (Rothschild 1981, p. 6). It should be acknowl-
edged that it is a rather challenging task to come up with a direct
measurement of the notion of ethno-nationalism. However, this study
utilizes a proxy for having a sense of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in
society: support for ethno-political formations. It simply refers to voting
for Kurdish ethno-nationalist or ethno-political formations and move-
ments (e.g. an ethnic party), which seek to ‘combat ethnic antagonists
or to impress ethnically defined interests [e.g. cultural, political rights]
on the agenda of the state’ (Esman, quoted in Watts 2006, p. 132).
In the 1990s, several pro-Kurdish parties emerged on the Turkish
political stage, such as the People’s Labour Party [HEP] 19903, the
Democracy Party [DEP] 19934 and the People’s Democracy Party
[HADEP] 19942003. These parties represented a kind of ‘issue
parties’ because their primary concern was the Kurdish problem. In
general, they argued that the Kurdish problem could not be reduced to
a security problem. Rather, it was primarily an ethno-political matter.
Therefore, they claimed, there was an urgent need for a political
solution such as the granting of autonomy or cultural rights to the
Kurds (e.g. publishing, broadcasting and teaching in Kurdish), halting
the state of emergency in the south-eastern Turkey and an amnesty for
PKK members (see Barkey 1998; Guney 2002; Watts 1999, 2006).
They have also advocated socio-economic development in the south
east, where the Kurds constitute the vast majority of the population.5
In operationalizing the notion of ‘Kurdish ethno-nationalism’, this
study uses support for the pro-Kurdish HADEP, the party operating at
the time of the survey. Like its predecessors, HADEP also viewed the
Kurdish issue as an ethno-political issue and as one of the most
important political problems of the Republic. Thus, as a typical pro-
Kurdish party, HADEP was a good representation of an ethno-
political movement (also see Yavuz 1999).6 Therefore support for this
party should give us some sense of Kurdish ethno-nationalism.
The independent variables of interest are religiosity, income and
education. Religiosity here refers to the significance of religion in one’s
life. In measuring this concept, individuals’ responses to the question
of ‘how important is religion in your life?’ are used. However, in order
to minimize measurement error, alternative indicators such as
‘attending religious services’ (i.e. the frequency of visiting mosque)
and ‘self-identification as a religious person’ are also used in
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operationalizing this key variable.7 With respect to measuring the
socio-economic status of individuals, income (household) and educa-
tion levels are used (see Appendix A).
Control variables
I also control for a number of factors that might shape individuals’
attitudes vis-à-vis ethno-nationalist movements. For instance,
(Turkish) nationalists should be less likely to support Kurdish
ethno-nationalist movements and groups. Ideology (left vs. right)
might also play some role because it is a fact that pro-Kurdish
movements and parties have been characterized by leftist discourses
(Barkey 1998; Guney 2002, p. 127). Thus, left-oriented individuals
should be more supportive of Kurdish ethno-political actors.
Another factor that we should take into account is regional
identification. It is argued that the regional concentration of ethnic
groups might facilitate group mobilization by providing shared
grievances. These shared resentments might increase support for
ethno-nationalist formations in such regions (see Gurr 1993, p. 175;
Gurr and Harff 1994; also Watts 2006, p. 130). It is actually the case
that, compared to western Turkey, individuals in the primarily
Kurdish south-eastern provinces are more likely to vote for pro-
Kurdish candidates (Watts 2006, p. 130; Yavuz 1999, p. 134). Thus,
one might expect that individuals with strong regional attachments
might find ethno-nationalist movements more appealing than in-
dividuals having attachments to, say, the whole country. Gender and
age, standard factors in public opinion analyses, are also included
in the model as possible predictors of pro-Kurdish attitudes
(see Appendix A for the measurement of all variables).8
Data, sample and estimation technique
In order to test hypotheses presented above, this study uses data
provided by the World Values Survey (19992000).9 The original
sample included more than 4500 respondents from various parts of the
country. However, due to missing values, the sample used in this study
includes 2967 respondents. To facilitate interpretation, certain recod-
ing was also made to the data set (see Appendix A). The dependent
variable measures ‘support for an ethno-political formation (i.e.
HADEP)’. Since it is binary (0: none; 1: pro), using the popular
OLS (ordinary least squares) estimates would not be appropriate
because OLS estimates with a discrete dependent variable are likely to
violate the assumption of homoscedasticity (constant variance of the
error term across the sample) and of a normally distributed error term
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(Long 1997). Therefore this study uses logistic regression as a statistical
method.
Statistical results
Table 1 presents logit estimates. The statistical results reveal the rather
interesting situation that, although there is a negative relationship
between religiosity and the likelihood of Kurdish ethno-nationalism, it
is not statistically significant. I used different measurements of the
notion of ‘religiosity’ but the results were the same, which suggest that
increases in the level of religiosity do not really reduce the likelihood of
support for ethno-political formations. This finding implies that ethnic
awareness is not necessarily incompatible with religious consciousness
in the sense that Kurdish ethnic identity may coexist with Islamic
identity. In other words, unlike the pro-Islamic approach, which
assumes a zero-sum relationship between these two factors, increased
religiousness is not antithetical to Kurdish nationalism. As Atacan’s
(2001) analysis of Med-Zehra, a Kurdish Islamic movement in Turkey,
also shows us, there may also be Kurdish ethno-nationalists who are
heavily influenced by Islamic ideas and values. Therefore, the pro-
Islamic approach should not ignore the possibility of ethno-religious
sentiments among the Kurds.
Table 1. Logit analysis of ‘Kurdish ethno-nationalism’
Estimates
Predictors Dep. var.: Kurdish ethno-nationalism
Religiosity .0093725 (.1439323)
Income .2772304** (.1031143)
Education .1667951* (.0718978)
Control variables
Nationalist 1.130441*** (.120256)
Ideology (left-right) .3611055*** (.0662517)
Regional attachments .2031714* (.0931735)
Gender .2871644 (.2724574)
Age .0063614 (.0094577)
N 2967
Pseudo R2 0.3096
Log likelihood 258.9703
Wald chi2(8) 233.69
Probchi2 0.0000
Notes
*pB.05, **pB.01, ***pB.001.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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However we should note that there are sharp differences between
Kurdish Islamists’ and pro-Islamists’ approaches to religion. As
Houston rightly observes, the understanding of ‘Muslim brotherhood’,
which is considered as a key to solving the Kurdish problem by pro-
Islamists, is regarded as ‘an acknowledgement of their created cultural
particularity’ by Kurdish Islamists. Houston (1999, p. 91) suggests
that, for Kurdish Islamists, şeriat (Islamic law) represents a refuge,
which provides them a legal space to express their Kurdishness (see
also Bruinessen 2000, p. 15). In her analyses of Islamist writers,
Sakallioglu also draws attention to this difference:
Kurdish-Islamist writers tend to search for a ‘space’ for Kurdish
ethnic distinctiveness within the framework of the suggested formula
of ummah, the Islamic community of the faithful, while the position
of the Turkish-Islamist writers leans heavily toward defending the
integrity of the Turkish state rather than to acknowledging a
Kurdish ethnic distinctiveness. (Cizre-Sakallioglu 1998, p. 75)
Thus, religion in Kurdish Islam does not necessarily obstruct ethnic
awareness, which is also supported by the empirical findings of this
study. This finding is also consistent with the observation that the
revival of Islam in Turkey in the last two or three decades had limited
influence on Kurdish nationalism. Therefore, given the fact that
religiosity does not really reduce the likelihood of ethno-nationalist
tendencies, the promotion of the idea of ‘Islamic brotherhood’ as an
antidote against Kurdish ethno-nationalism becomes an unsound
project.
However, this empirical finding raises a further question that we
need to address: how can we explain the substantial Kurdish support
for certain pro-Islamic or conservative parties which advocate
transcending ethnic particularisms and demands? Given the fact that
pro-Islamic parties in general put emphasis on the notion of the
broader Islamic community (ümmet) and Islam as a binding factor
between Turks and Kurds and reject ethno-nationalist understandings
and demands (Atacan 2001, p. 111), it becomes puzzling that they still
perform relatively well among the Kurds (see also Baslevent,
Kirmanoglu and Senatalar 2005, p. 559; Bozarslan 1996, p. 18; Duran
1998; Atacan 2001, p. 111). What factors might account for this
perplexing situation?
As an explanation for the success of the explicitly pro-Islamic
Welfare Party among the Kurds, for instance, Bozarslan (1996, p. 18)
suggests that ideological and reactionary motivations were primary
factors behind this political outcome. Similarly, Yavuz (1998, pp. 11
13, 1999, 2003) suggests that the ‘oppositional identity’ of the pro-
Islamic parties has appealed to the Kurds, who were also marginalized
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by the political system. With respect to the success of the AKP, for
instance, Gunter and Yavuz (2007, p. 297) state that ‘[m]any Kurds
regard the AKP as an anti-Kemalist and anti-systemic party that has
been ‘‘suppressed’’ by the same enemy as they have’. Thus, it is
believed that such a perception promoted the popularity of these
parties among the Kurds.
This argument, however, is problematic for the following reason. If
we follow the logic that the Kurds tend to support political parties with
‘oppositional identity’, then the explicitly pro-Islamic Saadet Partisi
(Felicity Party), which represents much stronger oppositional and
revisionist identities, should have received more votes in the region
than the AKP during the last national elections (July 2007). It is a fact
that, compared to the explicitly revisionist and pro-Islamic SP, the
AKP appears to be more pro-Western, moderate, centrist and
conciliatory vis-à-vis the state establishment (see Mecham 2004; Nasr
2005, p. 23; Gunter and Yavuz 2007, pp. 2923). However, the AKP
performed much better among the Kurds than the unabashedly pro-
Islamic SP.10 Thus, it is difficult to argue that the popularity of certain
pro-Islamic or conservative parties among Kurdish ethno-nationalists
is due to their Islamist ideology or oppositional identity. Therefore,
there must be other factors that could account for this perplexing
situation.
My hunch is that the popularity of certain pro-Islamic or
conservative parties among the Kurds (e.g. the RP and the AKP)
might be due to their relatively better performances in managing the
economy, thereby bringing a certain degree of stability to the country
and, more importantly, providing certain material benefits to im-
poverished Kurdish people in shanty towns (both in the western and
eastern parts of the country) such as providing them with shelter, jobs,
food and fuel, and developing certain clientelistic relationships such as
attending weddings, circumcisions and burial ceremonies (see Onis
1997; Barkey 1998; see also White 2002; Toprak 2005, p. 181; Yavuz
and Ozcan 2007, pp. 1301). We should bear in mind that one
characteristic of the Turkish party system has been the high degree of
volatility, which refers to ‘sudden and significant changes in party
votes from one election to the next’ (Ozbudun 2000, pp. 7480). This
political reality seems to suggest that ideological concerns/attachments
do not play a substantial role in voting preferences among Turkish
electorate. Within such a political culture, clientelistic relations and
material benefit concerns might play a greater role in shaping voters’
preferences. As a result, we can expect that political patronage has
been playing a similar role in Kurdish support for the pro-Islamic
parties in Turkey.
Another interesting finding is that there is a negative and
statistically significant relationship between socio-economic factors
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(income and education levels) and support for ethno-nationalist
formations. Put differently, individuals with a better socio-economic
status (i.e. higher level of education and income) are less likely to have
ethno-nationalist tendencies. This finding negates the arguments that
are sceptical of a negative relationship between socio-economic status
and ethno-political demands. For instance, Aydinli suggests that:
Of course, there are challenges to an economic understanding and to
economic endeavours. First, it is far from proven theoretically that
economic developments will silence the political/cultural demands of
the emerging Kurdish politics. The unreliability of an economic
solution is even greater in the wake of such a long and confronta-
tional experience, which may very well have increased ethnic and
political awareness among the Kurds. (Aydinli 2002, p. 218)
As discussed above, theoretically there are competing orientations
within the socio-economic approach. However, the statistical results of
this study support the position that anticipates that an improvement in
the socio-economic status of disadvantaged individuals is likely to
constrain support for ethno-political formations. At least, this is what
we see in the Turkish context. This finding is also consistent with the
postulation given above that the popularity of pro-Islamic parties
among the Kurds might be due to their relatively better performances
in delivering certain material benefits to these needy people.
That said, this finding may not disconfirm the hypothesis which
claims a positive relationship between these two factors. It might be
the case that there may be a certain threshold after which socio-
economic development accelerates ethno-political awareness, paving
the way for identity-related mobilization and demands. In other words,
there might be a curvilinear relationship between socio-economic
status and ethno-nationalist attitudes. In order to see whether this is
the case, we need to design comparative studies and look at how these
two factors interrelate in other socio-political contexts.
With respect to the control variables, as expected, (Turkish)
nationalists are less likely to be supportive of Kurdish ethno-
nationalism. Similarly, moving from the left to the right of the
political spectrum decreases the likelihood of Kurdish ethno-
nationalism. However, it is striking that individuals, who have strong
regional attachments, are more likely to have ethno-nationalist
tendencies. In other words, an individual, who identifies herself with
her region or province rather than with the country, is more likely to
have a pro-Kurdish tendency. However gender and age did not matter.
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The following final section discusses some implications of these
empirical findings.
Implications
This study investigated the impact of religiosity and socio-economic
factors on the appeal to Kurdish ethno-nationalist movements and
formations in order to have a better assessment of two distinct
approaches (i.e. pro-Islamic and socio-economic) shaping efforts to
deal with Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey. Statistical results
indicate that religiosity does not really matter in terms of the
likelihood of Kurdish ethno-nationalism. In other words, increases
in religiosity do not necessarily reduce ethnic awareness. Interestingly,
however, as the level of education and income increases, the likelihood
of Kurdish ethno-nationalism decreases. These findings raise doubts
about the validity of the pro-Islamic approach but they do provide
some support for the socio-economic approach in constraining
Kurdish ethno-nationalism.
If we move from research findings to policy recommendations, it
would be difficult to suggest that socio-economic development alone
would be the panacea for Turkey’s Kurdish problem, a rather
complicated issue involving political, trans-national and security
dimensions. However, the empirical findings of this study clearly
suggest that socio-economic development in the impoverished Kurdish
regions would certainly make the problem more manageable. That
said, a caveat is in order: in the long run, socio-economic development
might accelerate ethno-political awareness and demands. As indicated
above, the ‘politics of difference’ can also be strong among the
members of advantaged groups. Therefore, socio-economic policies
should be accompanied by other measures such as granting certain
cultural rights.
To be fair, since the Turkish Republic was recognized as a candidate
state for European Union [EU] membership in 1999, Turkey has
achieved significant constitutional, legislative and institutional
changes in the post-Helsinki era, which brought Turkey much closer
to the EU standards in terms of the level of human rights. Within this
process, Turkish governments have granted certain cultural rights (e.g.
allowing broadcasting in Kurdish and learning Kurdish through
private language courses) for the Kurds on the basis of individual
rights. However, the author’s interviews with certain pro-Kurdish
leaders and activists indicate that although these changes are regarded
as important, they fall short of being satisfactory.11
The state establishment tends to reduce the Kurdish issue to a
matter of security (i.e. terrorism) and regional underdevelopment,
ignoring its ethno-political dimensions due to fears that responding to
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identity-related demands might result in separation (Yegen 1996,
p. 216). Such an understanding, however, does not remove the
Kurdishness of the Kurdish question. Therefore, the Turkish Republic
should be much more responsive to the demands of Kurdish identity.
Other than socio-economic measures, such measures should be
another tool to be used in dealing with Kurdish ethno-nationalism.
This, in turn, would also promote the consolidation of liberal
democracy in EU-hopeful Turkey.
Postscript
In March 2009, Turkey held local elections. The election results
provide further empirical evidence for the arguments of this study. It is
striking that the popularity of the ruling, conservative AKP in
provinces populated mostly by the Kurds decreased from 45 per cent
to 31.5 per cent, while the pro-Kurdish DTP increased its votes in
those places to 44 per cent and regained the control of several
municipalities. This result was shocking for the AKP officials and
conservative circles because it was expected that certain initiatives by
the conservative government such as the introduction of a public TV
channel, which broadcasts only in Kurdish (TRT 6), would promote
Kurdish support for the religion-sensitive party. Despite this, the
Kurds opted for voting for the openly ethnonationalist party. This
outcome clearly indicates that neither the AKP’s conservative identity
nor the idea of ‘Islamic brotherhood’ promoted by conservative circles
necessarily constrains or weakens ethno-nationalist tendencies among
the Kurds.
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Notes
1. In the early 1980s, an armed conflict erupted between the security forces and the
separatist PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party, Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, established in 1978).
The number of people killed between 1984 and 1999 is estimated to have been around 30,000
(half of them PKK members, one-quarter civilians and one-quarter security members). The
cost of fighting, during this period, was more than 100 billion dollars. Although its intensity
has declined dramatically since the capture of PKK leader Ocalan by Turkish security forces
in 1999 in Kenya, the fighting resumed in the spring of 2005.
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2. For more on the evolution and impact of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey, see
Entessar (1992), McDowall (1996) and Olson (1996).
3. It is important to indicate that this approach was rather different from the official state
position, which treats Kurdish, Bosniak, Albanian and Chechen identities as sub-identities
under the Turkish identity (Yavuz and Ozcan 2006, p. 112). In the following period, the
Turkish military expressed its concerns about such an initiative. The military argued that the
treatment of the Turkish identity as an ethnic sub-identity was contradictory to the unitary
nature of the Turkish nation-state.
4. Author’s interview, Oran-Ankara, 25 December 2005.
5. It is argued that Kurds constitute 70 per cent of the population in the eastern and
south-eastern parts (see Mutlu 1996).
6. The party participated in the 1995 and 1999 national elections. Although it could not
pass the nationwide election threshold (10 per cent), the party received the majority of votes
in the south east, populated mostly by Kurds (Bozarslan 1996, p. 18; Kurkcu 1996, p. 4).
Moreover, in 1999 municipal elections, HADEP’s candidates won most of major cities and
towns in the region (Barkey 1998; Guney 2002).
7. For a similar measurement of ‘religiosity’, see Baslevent, Kirmanoglu and Senatalar
(2005, p. 554).
8. One might argue that we should also control for ‘ethnic origin’ because it might well be
expected that ethnic Kurds should be more likely to be supportive of pro-Kurdish
formations. However, it is a fact that not all pro-Kurdish actors are ethnic Kurds and not
all Kurds are pro-Kurdish (Watts 2006, p. 132). Therefore, the exclusion of ethnic origin does
not pose a major problem in terms of model specification.
9. The World Values Survey data set is produced by the European Values Study
Foundation and World Values Survey Association. The goal of the project is to learn more
about values and cultural changes in societies all over the world. It is a highly used data set in
scholarly analyses of public attitudes and values. The data source is: European and World
Values Surveys Four-Wave Integrated Date File, 19812004, v.20060423, 2006 (Turkey,
NovemberDecember 2000). For more information, see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
The survey data for Turkey were collected by Bogazici University in NovemberDecember
2000.
10. During the July 2007 national elections, the AKP received 45 per cent of total votes in
provinces mostly populated by Kurds (Diyarbakir, Van, Siirt, Sanliurfa, Mus, Mardin,
Hakkari, Sirnak, Batman, Bitlis). The pro-Kurdish DTP, however, received 40 per cent of the
votes in those places. The openly pro-Islamic SP performed rather poorly.
11. Author’s interviews with: Ahmet Turk (co-leader of the pro-Kurdish Democratic
Society Party, DTP); Edip Polat (the Chairperson of Kurdish Writers Association); Mustafa
Sezgin Tanrikulu (the President of the Bar of Diyarbakir); Osman Baydemir (Diyarbakir
Mayor); Selahattin Demirtas (the Chairperson of Human Rights Association, Diyarbakir
Branch); Servet Deniz (Kurdish Institute); Songul Erol Abdil (Tunceli Mayor); Yusuf Alatas
(the President of Human Rights Association) in Ankara, Tunceli and Diyarbakir, in June
July 2006.
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Appendix A. Variables and measurement
Survey question used for measurement
Variable Original Recoded
Kurdish
ethno-nationalism
V183 (v220): If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on
this list would you vote?
1. ANAP 6. HADEP 1. HADEP
2. CHP 7. MHP 0. Other
3. DSP 8. Other
4. DYP 10. None
5. FP
Religiosity V9 (v9): How important is religion in your life?
1. Very important 0. Not at all important
2. Rather important 1. Not very important
3. Not very important 2. Rather important
4. Not at all important 3. Very important
Income S198 (v236): Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group
your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that
come in?
(Low) 1 2 3 4 . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .8 9 10 (High)
Education V189 (v226): What is the highest educational level that you have attained?
1. No formal education
2. Incomplete primary school
. . . .
9. University-level education, with degree
Nationalist V180 (v216): How proud are you to be Turkish?
5
5
2
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Appendix A (Continued)
Survey question used for measurement
Variable Original Recoded
1. Very proud 0. Not at all proud
2. Quite proud 1. Not very proud
3. Not very proud 2. Quite proud
4. Not at all proud 3. Very proud
Ideology (left-right) V106 (v139): In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you
place your views on this scale, generally speaking?
1 (left) . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .10 (right)
Regional identification V178 (v214): Geographical identification
1. Local
2. Region
3. Country
4. Continent
5. The world
Gender V186 (v223): Sex of respondent
1. Male 0. Female
2. Female 1. Male
Age V188 (v225): Age of the respondent (1891)
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